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PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED STATE AND PUBLIC
CONTROL OVER OCS LEASING: THE TIMING OF
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
Federal statutory procedures provide local governments and the
public various opportunities to provide input regarding oil and gas
leases on the Outer Continental Shelf. However, these channels of
input fall far short of facilitating effective participation by these
groups in federal decisions concerning those leases. This Comment
suggests that earlier public availability of the Draft Environmen-
tal Impact Statement may remedy some of the inadequacies of the
current process.
INTRODUCTION
On July 15, 1981, former Secretary of the Interior James Watt
announced plans to accelerate the five-year Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) 1 lease schedule prepared by former Secretary Andrus.' Over
thirty-eight million acres of OCS lands have been offered for lease
by the federal government since 1953.3 The Department of Interior,
however, will offer oil and gas leases for an unprecedented one bil-
lion acres of federal offshore lands under the present plan.
Coastal states, local governments, and environmental groups have
become increasingly concerned with protecting their coastal and
marine environments, and with the potential local economic impacts
of prospective OCS activity.' Conversely, the federal government,
along with many scientists, energy experts, and economists, believes
increased offshore development is a promising opportunity to meet
1. The OCS includes all submerged lands under United States jurisdiction lying
seaward of the three-mile territorial sea granted to the states under the Submerged
Lands Act. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(2), 1331(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The seaward
distance of the OCS is limited by the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,
opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
2. [12 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 371 (July 17, 1981).
3. [12 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 491, 492 (Aug. 14, 1981).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Yi, Application of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lease Sales, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 160 n.13 (1982).
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national energy needs.'
As the federal government and the oil industry continue to pursue
this national interest, coastal states and public interest groups are
demanding more input into the present OCS management process.
Such attempts to influence the OCS oil and gas leasing process have
generally met with federal agency resistance, and have led to numer-
ous unsuccessful lawsuits 7 against the Department of Interior
(DOI).6
Three federal statutes provide for state and local government and/
or public participation in the Department of the Interior's decision-
making process." However, the current system for input is inade-
quate because (1) the Secretary of the Interior has broad discretion
regarding OCS management, 10 and is characteristically unreceptive
to outside input; (2) direct local government and public input is se-
verely restricted; 1 and (3) state, local and public participation is not
provided early enough in the planning process to be effective.
One federal statute does provide the flexibility to allow earlier,
and thus more effective, outside input to DOI's decision-making. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1 2 requires the Depart-
ment of the Interior to circulate a Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (DEIS) to local governments and to the public "early" in
the pre-leasing process.13 The purpose of the DEIS is to advise local
governments and the public of the proposed leasing plan and its po-
tential environmental effects, and to request their comments and
suggestions.1 4 The current timing of the DEIS in the Department of
the Interior's OCS pre-leasing process is inadequate because local
governments and the public do not have the opportunity to respond
to the draft impact statement until after several environmentally sig-
nificant decisions are made.15
This Comment reviews the current opportunities for state, local
6. The OCS can be this country's largest source of domestic oil and gas by the
1990s (see 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450, 1481), and the recoverable petro-
leum in the OCS is at least as large as reserves on United States lands. Franssen, Oil and
Gas In the Oceans, 61 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 338, 388 (1980).
7. See, e.g., North Slope v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); California v.
Andrus, 608 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1979); Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.
1979); Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975).
8. See infra note 25. DOI has authority for the management of OCS resource
leasing.
9. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Jones, Understanding the Offshore Oil and Gas Controversy, 17
GONz. L. REV. 221, 242 (1982).
11. See infra note 149.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
13. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.5, 1502.5 (1982); see also notes 139-141 infra and
accompanying text.
14. See infra 116-119 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text.
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government, and public influence on the Department of the Interior's
OCS decisions, and suggests that earlier public availability of the
DEIS may help cure some of the inadequacies of the current process.
LOCAL AND PUBLIC CONTROL OF OCS LEASING
Current Statutory Structure
Under international law, the United States has the right to exploit
submerged lands off its coasts to whatever depths technologically
possible.16 For many years, however, the federal government and the
state of California have battled over the ownership of the submerged
lands adjacent to that State's coast.1 7 In 1947, the Supreme Court
held that the federal government owned all submerged lands sea-
ward of the California coast."i However, in 1953, Congress passed
the Submerged Lands Act,19 granting states ownership of all sub-
merged lands within three miles of their shores. Ownership of lands
seaward of this three-mile territorial sea, to the limits of national
jurisdiction 2 -- the Outer Continental Shelf-was retained by the
federal government.
Three federal statutes control OCS resource development: the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 21 the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA),22 and the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA). 2
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act governs all phases of ac-
tivity relating to the OCS seabed and subsoil.24 This Act gives the
Department of the Interior authority for administering OCS leasing
and for prescribing necessary rules and regulations regarding the
leasing process. OCSLA does not provide for direct public input
16. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 1.
17. See, e.g., United States v. California, 447 U.S. 1 (1980); United States v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
18. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804, 805 (1947). Seaward of the coast
means seaward of the ordinary low water mark on the coast. Id.
19. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The United States relin-
quished all lands beneath navigable waters within 3 miles of the states' coastlines. United
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1959), reh'g denied, 364 U.S. 856 (1960).
20. See supra note 16.
21. 43 U.S.C. 3§ 1331-1356 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
22. 16 U.S.C. §3 1451-1464 (1982).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
24. 43 U.S.C. § 1332. OCSLA was intended to assert ownership of and jurisdic-
tion over the subsoil and seabed of the OCS and artificial islands erected thereon, which
does not include the sea above the subsoil or the air above the sea. Guess v. Read, 290
F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 957 (1962).
25. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
into DOI's handling of offshore leasing matters, and local and state
governmental input is limited under the Act.2"
The Coastal Zone Management Act provides for voluntary coop-
eration, with respect to the development of the OCS, between the
affected coastal state, the federal government and the petroleum in-
dustry.27 The Act requires certain offshore activities28 to be consis-
tent 28 with the state's approved coastal management program, 30 and
provides that other activities, before they commence, are to be re-
viewed by the state.31 State participation under CZMA is voluntary
and contingent upon the Secretary of Commerce's approval of the
state's management program. 3 2 Incentives for involvement include
federal financial assistance33 and the potential for greater influence
over OCS decisions. 34
Presently, some confusion exists regarding the relationship be-
tween CZMA and OCSLA, particularly, whether CZMA's consis-
tency requirements apply to OCS lease sales.35 One source of this
confusion is the conflicting underlying purposes of the two Acts. The
thrust of OCSLA is toward rapid fulfillment of national energy
needs, 36 whereas CZMA was designed to protect the environment.37
The National Environmental Policy Act requires federal agencies
to assess the environmental impacts of proposed OCS activities and
to compose an environmental impact statement (EIS) before the ac-
tivities begin. 38 Because of the uncertain applicability of CZMA's
consistency requirements to OCS lease sales, and the inadequate op-
portunity for outside input under OCSLA, 9 the National Environ-
mental Policy Act has become the predominant mechanism used by
states, local governments, and environmental groups to challenge
26. See infra note 149.
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982).
28. See infra note 66.
29. The consistency doctrine refers to efforts to conform governmental regulations
to regional land use plans.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(8) (1982); see also note 32 infra and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
32. A state's coastal zone management program (see, e.g., California Coastal Act,
Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 30,000-30,900 (West 1977)) must be submitted for approval to
the Secretary of Commerce and must reflect the national energy interest. 16 U.S.C. §
1455(c)(8) (1982). Only upon such submission and approval will the consistency require-
ments of CZMA (which give the state much greater control over OCS development)
apply. Id. §§ 1456(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(B), (d) (1982).
33. The Reagan Administration has proposed to reduce or eliminate financial aid
to coastal states. See Yi, supra note 5, at 168 n. 84.
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1455 (1982); see infra note 67 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
36. See Yi, supra note 5 at 169.
37. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4327 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see also notes 102-106 infra,
and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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federal offshore oil and gas leasing.40
The OCS Leasing Process
The OCSLA-authorized leasing process begins with the Depart-
ment of the Interior's preparation of a five-year leasing plan.41 The
Secretary of the Interior must consider the size, timing, and location
of the proposed leasing to find a plan which will best suit the nation's
energy needs.42 The plan must also assess and consider the "eco-
nomic, social, and environmental values of the renewable and nonre-
newable resources contained in" the OCS, and the potential impact
of the planned activity on the marine, coastal and human
environments.43
Next, the DOI must narrow the proposed lease sales to specific
tracts in the general areas described in the program.44 A Draft Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (DEIS) is then issued describing the
proposed leasing and its potential environmental consequences. Pub-
lic and local government responses to the DEIS are solicited. The
responses are recorded and answered in the Final Environmental Im-
pact Statement (FEIS),45 issued prior to the Secretary's final deci-
sion regarding which specific tracts will be leased.46
The Secretary of the Interior then offers the offshore tracts listed
in the FEIS for competitive bidding at lease sales, and grants devel-
opment rights to specific tracts to "the highest responsible qualified
bidder." 47 The oil companies awarded leases may explore and de-
velop the oil and gas contained within the lease area.48
40. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
41. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 1344(a)(1). The Secretary must structure the leasing program "to obtain
a proper balance between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the
discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone." 43
U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3).
44. See infra notes 126-133 and accompanying text (steps leading up to an OCS
lease sale are considered in greater detail).
45. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (1982).
46. See infra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
47. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976 &'Supp. V 1981).
48. Id. § 1337(b)(4). After being awarded the lease, the lessee explores and evalu-
ates the seabed under a DOI-approved exploration plan. The lessee cannot begin oil pro-
duction until the DOI approves the lessee's development and production plan. Id. § 1351.
The Secretary must submit the lessee's production plan(s) to the governor of the affected
local governments. Id. § 1351(a)(3). The plan(s) must also be made available to the
public. Id. § 1351.
Additionally, depending on the stage in the pre-oil production process, CZMA may
require a consistency determination be made before further action is taken by the DOI or
State, Local Government and Public Participation in Federal OCS
Leasing Decisions
Local communities will most acutely suffer the adverse impacts of
offshore oil development. Oil from OCS operations is generally
transported to adjacent land for processing.49 Much of the oil
processing equipment is situated under the waters and on the coast
of the adjacent state.50 In addition to potentially severe economic
burdens for local communities,5 there are catastrophic possibilities
for the local marine environment, including air, water, visual, and
noise pollution. 52 Although local communities will be the hardest hit
by the ill effects of OCS oil production, their input to the OCS deci-
sion-making process is almost nonexistent.53
Although the federal government has exclusive dominion over the
OCS seabed and subsoil,5 4 Congress has provided various channels
for states, local governments, and the public to influence DOI's off-
shore leasing decisions.55 When Congress enacted the Coastal Zone
Management Act, improved federal-state cooperation and planning
in coastal resources development was intended.56 Such improved re-
lations, however, have not occurred. Instead, federal-state communi-
cations on this subject have often been antagonistic.57 Federal agen-
cies, particularly the Department of the Interior, have opposed
efforts by the states and the Office of Coastal Zone Management58 to
exercise or expand their influence.5
Direct state and local participation in federal offshore leasing deci-
sions has three basic statutory sources. First are the consistency re-
the petroleum industry. See infra note 66.
49. See Breeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer Continental Shelf
Mineral Resources, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1107 (1976).
50. Id.
51. Adverse impacts of these operations include the costs of constructing new roads
and/or repairing old ones due to increased oil industry use, installing new utilities, de-
signing new water supply and sewage treatment facilities, and providing new housing,
schools and public services (e.g., fire, police) to the new oil workers and their families.
See id. at 1107-08.
52. Id. at 1108.
53. See infra note 149.
54. See supra notes 20 and 24 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1451-1452 (1982) (declarations of congressional policy).
57. Gendler, Offshore Oil Power Plays: Maximizing State Input into Federal Re-
source Decision Making, 12 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 347, 347-48 (1979).
58. OCZM is a subdivision of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (the latter agency was created by the Secretary of Commerce to administer the
CZMA).
59. Comment, Toward Better Use of Coastal Resources: Coordinated State and
Federal Planning Under the Coastal Zone Management Act, 65 GEo. L.J. 1057, 1072
(1977).The author believes federal agencies involved in the OCS decision-making process
"remain concerned primarily with protecting their own authority and ... react slowly to
demands for new organizational processes." Id.
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quirements of CZMA; second is section 19 of the 1978 amendments
of OCSLA; and third is NEPA's environmental impact statement
requirement. Furthermore, a state or local government presumably
has the ability, outside of the federal statutory structure, to influence
oil development adjacent to its coast, and thus indirectly affect leas-
ing decisions.60
Applicability of CZMA Consistency Requirements
The Coastal Zone Management Act was enacted to preserve and
protect the resources of the nation's coastal zone6 ' from environmen-
tally adverse development.6 2 As previously mentioned, state partici-
pation under this Act is voluntary; the main requirement is the de-
velopment of a comprehensive coastal zone land use plan.6 3 Once the
state program is approved by the Secretary of Commerce, 4
CZMA's five consistency requirements are triggered.6 5 Certain fed-
eral activities within or affecting the coastal zone must be conducted
in a manner consistent with the state program's provisions." Under
60. See Breeden, supra note 49, at 1115. Coastal states retain their authority
under CZMA and OCSLA to regulate petroleum facilities falling within their jurisdic-
tions, including the waters out to the three-mile territorial sea boundary (established as
the state jurisdictional border under the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§
1301(a)(2), 1331(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). State and local governments could enact
land use restrictions to prevent oil companies from constructing refineries, processing
plants and other facilities necessary to their OCS operations. Because the state controls
rights-of-way from its shoreline to the three-mile territorial sea boundary, land use re-
strictions could prevent pipeline access to the shore. Such restrictions would likely be
challenged by the oil companies on constitutional grounds (such as under the Commerce
Clause), although the result of such a challenge is unclear. See Gendler, supra note 57,
at 368-69.
61. "Coastal zone" is defined in CZMA as the state's "coastal waters (including
the lands therein and thereunder) and the adjacent shorelands (including the waters
therein and thereunder) . . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1982). The coastal zone extends
three miles seaward from the state's shoreline to the United States territorial sea bound-
ary established by international law. Id.; see also supra note 1.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1982).
63. Id. § 1454.
64. See id. § 1455(c) (requirements for approval of state coastal zone management
plan).
65. Id. §§ 1456(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(B), (d).
66. Activities subject to a consistency determination include: (1) those conducted
or supported by a federal agency which directly affect the coastal zone, (2) development
projects undertaken by federal agencies in the coastal zone, (3) OCS post-lease sale ac-
tivities affecting the coastal zone's land or water uses which require a federal licensq or
permit, (4) plans submitted by any person to the Secretary of the Interior for the explo-
ration or development of, or production from any area leased under OCSLA, when the
planned activity affects any land or water use in the coastal zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (c),
(d) (1982).
CZMA, the key to state control over federal offshore activity is the
state's ability to object to a consistency determination by the federal
agency. 71
The most promising CZMA provision for state control over fed-
eral Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas leasing is section 307(c)(1).
This section requires federal agencies involved with activities "di-
rectly affecting" a state's coastal zone to conduct such activities in a
manner "to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with [the]
approved state management programs."68 Until recently, because
this section does not expressly refer to lease sales, 9 controversy ex-
isted70 over whether section 307(c)(1)'s consistency requirement ap-
plied to DOI's offshore lease sales.7 1 The central issue was whether
the sale of offshore leases "directly affects" the coastal zone of the
state, thus requiring the Secretary of the Interior to submit a consis-
tency determinination for the state's review.
The Supreme Court has apparently settled this dispute in Secre-
tary of the Interior v. California.7 2 A narrow majority 3 held that
OCS oil and gas lease sales do not "directly affect" the state's
coastal zone within CZMA's meaning, and thus a consistency review
is not required.7' Since neither the CZMA itself, nor accompanying
legislative materials, define the term "directly affecting," the major-
67. Under CZMA section 307(c)(1) (the only consistency provision with potential
applicability to the DOI's pre-leasing activities), federal activities "directly affecting the
coastal zone" must be consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with the state's
approved program. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982). The DOI determines whether section
307(c)(1) applies. The state reviews this determination and may object. However, despite
contentions that the consistency provisions are intended to give states leverage over fed-
eral actions, section 307(c)(1) can at most be viewed as a non-binding channel of state
input to the DOI's decisions. See, e.g., Linsley, Federal Consistency and Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing: The Application of the "Directly Affecting" Test to Pre-
Lease Sale Activities, 9 B.C. ENVTL. L. REv. 431, 444 n.67 (1980). If the state objects
to the consistency determination, the federal agency is not required to disapprove the
particular activity (e.g. lease sale) unless judicially compelled to do so. Id.
For comprehensive discussions of CZMA and its consistency requirements, see gener-
ally Yi, supra note 5; Comment, supra note 59; Shaffer, OCS Development and the
Consistency Provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act: A Legal and Policy Anal-
ysis, 4 Omo N.U.L. REv., 595 (1977); Moore, Outer Continental Shelf Development
and Recent Application of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1971, 15 TuLSA L.J.
443 (1980); Deller, Federalism and Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing: Must Federal Tract
Selections and Lease Stipulations be Consistent with State Coastal Zone Management
Programs?, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 105 (1980).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982).
69. Lease sales are the products of tract selection and lease provisions decisions.
See infra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
70. See e.g., Linsley, supra note 67, at 453-84. Controversy still exists, however,
despite the sharply divided Court in Secretary of Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656
(1984); see discussion infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Linsley, supra note 67, at 453-84.
72. 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
73. The Secretary of Interior v. California case was a 5/4 decision.
74. 104 S. Ct. at 672.
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ity pieced together its conclusion from an extensive investigation of
the Act's legislative history.75 In so doing, the Court reached a con-
clusion contrary to that of both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals. 6
The four-Justice dissent in Secretary of the Interior v. California,
lead by Justice Stevens, also went through a statutory construction
exercise, agreeing with the lower court decisions that the sale of
OCS leases did indeed directly affect the state's coastal zone,
thereby requiring a consistency determination by the Department of
the Interior."
The Coastal Zone Management Act's consistency provisions allow
the coastal state to influence certain OCS post-lease sale activities.78
Environmentally significant decisions are made, however, by the
DOI in the pre-lease sale stages of OCS development 79 Although
section 307(c)(1) of the Act provides a potential vehicle for state
influence upon those decisions, this potential has yet to be realized. 0
Furthermore, local government participation is very indirect," and
CZMA makes no provision for direct public input.82
OCSLA Section 19
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act was amended -in 1978 to
provide another method of state and local involvement in the OCS
leasing process.83 Under section 19 of the Act," the governor of an
affected state, and the executive of any affected local government
"may submit recommendations to the Secretary [of the Interior] re-
garding the size, timing, or location of a proposed lease sale or with
respect to a proposed development and production plan." 85 The Sec-
75. The majority, led by Justice O'Connor, concluded not only that lease sales are
not intended to be covered by Section 307(c)(1), but also that Congress did not intend
Section 307 of the Coastal Zone Management Act to cover any federal activities outside
of the state's 3-mile coastal zone. Id. at 666-67.
76. Secretary of Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), affg California v. Watt, 520 F.
Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981). The Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit inso-
far as it required DOI to conduct a consistency review. 104 S. Ct. at 672.
77. Secretary of Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. at 689 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. See supra note 66.
79. See infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
80. See note 67 supra.
81. See infra note 149.
82. Id.
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1345(a).
retary must accept recommendations of the governor and may accept
those of local governments if "they provide for a reasonable balance
between the national [energy] interest and the well-being of the citi-
zens of the affected State."'
However, the Secretary's decision whether to accept or reject such
recommendations is "final and shall not, alone, be a basis for [judi-
cial] invalidation of a proposed lease sale . . . unless found to be
arbitrary or capricious. ' 87 Given this broad discretion vested in the
Secretary concerning policy issues, and the Reagan Administration's
plans to significantly increase the exploitation of OCS resources,"8
one might question whether the apparent ability, under section 19, to
influence OCS lease sales decisions is not almost illusory.
National Environmental Policy Act
During the late 1960's, Congress recognized increasing public sup-
port for environmental protection and the political importance of en-
acting legislation addressing this concern. The National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 196989 became effective January 1, 1970.90 The
Act's three main components are (1) a declaration of a national en-
vironmental policy,9' (2) a procedural basis for implementing the
Act's objectives, 2 and (3) the establishment of the Council on Envi-
86. Id. § 1345(c).
87. Id. § 1345(d). In California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth
Circuit described its task in determining whether the Secretary of the Interior's rejection
of Governor Brown's recommendation regarding Lease Sale 53 was arbitrary or capri-
cious: "we must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors and whether there was a clear error of judgment . . . . Additionally, we
must consider whether the Secretary articulate[d] a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made . . . and whether the Secretary made the decision in
accordance with his duty under law.. . . The court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency." 683 F.2d at 1268-69.
The "arbitrary and capricious" test for judicial review is referred to as a narrower
scope of review than the "substantial evidence" test (the usual test) and the "clearly
erroneous" test. However, there is confusion as to how the three tests differ in applica-
tion. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 29.00 (Supp. 1982). In
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), a leading case regard-
ing the scope of review, the Court indicated the inquiry under the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" test is essentially the same inquiry as under the "clearly erroneous" test: whether
there has been a clear error of judgement. 401 U.S. at 416.; see also K. DAvis, ADMImS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 29.00. For a thorough treatment of judicial review of adminis-
trative findings, see id. at §§ 29.00-29.09.
88. See Yi, supra note 5, at 168. The Reagan Administration wants to increase the
pace of oil and gas leasing for over 875 million acres of the OCS. Id.; see also 46 Fed.
Reg. 39,226 (1981).
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. V 1980).
90. Id.
91. Id. at § 4331. The stated purpose of NEPA is to "declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment; [and] to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environ-
ment . . . and stimulate the health and welfare of man .... " Id. § 4321.
92. Id. §§ 4332-4334.
[VOL. 21: 709, 1984] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ronmental Quality (CEQ).9 3 The CEQ was created as a branch of
the Executive Office of the President 4 to advise the President on
environmental developments9 5 and to recommend national policies
and issue regulations 6 for the improvement of environmental quali-
ty.97 CEQ is the coordinating body for the implementation of
NEPA.98
Although the intended effect of NEPA is unclear,99 Congress at
the very least intended to assure that federal agencies fully consider
potential environmental consequences before taking action. 100 No
specific provisions exist in NEPA, however, for judicially enforcing
this goal.101
Section 102102 is the only NEPA provision which requires specific
actions by the federal agencies.103 The most crucial requirement is
93. Id. §§ 4341-4347.
94. Subchapter II of NEPA establishes the CEQ. Id. §§ 4341-4347.
95. The President must transmit to Congress an annual Environmental Quality
Report stating the status and foreseeable trends in the quality, management and utiliza-
tion of the environment. Id. § 4341. The CEQ prepares this report which the President
then submits to Congress. Id. § 4344(1).
96. The CEQ issued regulations in late 1978 which are binding on all federal
agencies. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508, 1500.3 (1982). CEQ had previously issued guidelines
which were merely advisory. The goal of the regulations is to minimize paperwork and
delay, while maximizing the quality of agency decisions. Id. §§ 1500.1, 1500.4, 1500.5.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 4344(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
98. Exec. Order No. 11,514, Protection and Enhancement of Environmental
Quality, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (Mar. 5 1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app. at 1722
(1976), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,991 (1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967, reprinted in
42 U.S.C. § 4321 app. at 872 (Supp. V 1981). This order empowered CEQ to generally
oversee the enhancement of the nation's environmental quality. 35 Fed. Reg. 4247-48.
99. See F. GRAD, 2 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 9.01 at 9-36 (1979).
NEPA has been described as an Environmental Bill of Rights, as the most important
administrative law ever passed, and as a mere preliminary step in the effectuation of a
national environmental control program. Id. One court stated NEPA is a value judgment
by Congress that to foster and promote general welfare, each generation of Americans
must act as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations. Arlington Coalition on
Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
100. See F. Grad, supra note 99, § 9.01 at 9-37; Jackson, Forward: Environmental
Quality, the Courts and the Congress, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1073, 1079 (1970).
101. Because NEPA neither precludes nor establishes mechanisms for judicial re-
view (see Liroff, NEPA Litigation in the 1970s: A Deluge or a Dribble?, 21 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 315, 317 (1981)), the Administrative Procedure Act provides review of an
agency's compliance with NEPA's procedural requirements. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
(1982); see also Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974) (provisions of
Administrative Procedure Act used to review compliance with NEPA).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
103. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. The rest of the Act is divided as
follows: § 4321, congressional declaration of purpose; §§ 4331-4335, policies and goals;
§§ 4341-4347 relate to the creation of and the duties of CEQ; and §§ 4361-4370 contain
miscellaneous provisions.
that all federal agencies include a detailed Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) "in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment." 104
NEPA does not require preparation of an EIS for every federal
agency action, but only for recommendations, proposals for legisla-
tion, and other federal actions which may significantly impact the
quality of the human environment.10 Prior to OCS lease sales, the
Secretary of the Interior must prepare an EIS under section 102.101
NEPA fundamentally changed federal agency decision-making
procedures: agencies were forced to broaden the information base
used to facilitate major decisions to include environmental factors,
and their planning processes were opened to public scrutiny. The
EIS is the primary instrument used to effectuate these changes.
Court enforcement of NEPA's provisions, particularly those in sec-
tion 102, is available: the courts generally10 7 recognize the public has
a clear right to demand an agency prepare an adequate EIS availa-
ble to the public.108
A court reviewing agency compliance with NEPA's procedural as-
pects109 might find at least four inadequacies in the agency's EIS
process: (1) failure to prepare a required EIS, (2) improper prepara-
tion of the EIS,110 (3) inadequate information in the statement,"1 or
(4) failure to use the EIS's information in making the decision. 112
This Comment suggests the current timing of the Draft Environmen-
tal Impact Statement might be challenged as not providing adequate
state and local influence at critical stages of the OCS leasing
process.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The EIS must discuss: (1)
the environmental impact of the proposed action, (2) unavoidable adverse environmental
effects of the action, (3) alternatives to the action, (4) the relationship between short-
term and long-term uses of the environment, and (5) irreversible and irretrievable com-
mitments of resources relating to implementation of the proposed action. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The CEQ regulations de-
fine the meaning of "major federal action" 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18; "proposal," id. §
1508.23; and "significantly," id. § 1508.27.
106. 43 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
107. However, in one early case under NEPA, the trial court held the Act is
merely a congressional statement of environmental policy which does not create any judi-
cially enforceable duties or rights. Bucldein v. Volpe, 2 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1082,
1083 (N.D. Cal. 1970). This judicial attitude has not altogether disappeared. See, e.g.,
Mountainbrook Homeowners Assoc. v. Adams, 492 F. Supp. 521, 526 (D.N.C. 1979),
afd, 620 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1980).
108. See F. GRAD, supra note 99, § 9.03 at 9-119.
109. For a discussion regarding whether NEPA created new substantive rights, see
F. GRAD, supra note 99, § 9.03 at 9-117 to 9-126.
110. See Comment, NEPA: Theories for Challenging Agency Action, 1982 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 665, 670-71.
111. Id. at 668-70.
112. Id. at 671-73.
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The Purpose and Importance of the EIS Timing
Once a federal agency determines a contemplated action requires
an EIS,113 the next important issue is at what stage in the planning
process the preparation of the initial or draft impact statement
should begin. 4 The timing of the draft EIS (DEIS) is of key impor-
tance to the quality and quantity of public input throughout the re-
mainder of the agency's decision-making process. An impact state-
ment provided early in the agency's planning process allows public
input to strongly influence the agency's initial decisions, increasing
the chances that subsequent decisions will reflect the public's envi-
ronmental concerns.11 5
This Comment will first examine the purpose of section 102's EIS
requirement. Thereafter, the timing of the DEIS in the OCS leasing
context needed to effectuate this purpose, will be explored.
The courts uniformly recognize that NEPA section 102(2)(C) has
a dual purpose:"' first, to inject environmental impact considerations
into the federal agency decision-making process; second, to inform
the public of the extent to which the agency has considered environ-
mental concerns in reaching its decisions. 17
The EIS allows parties otherwise removed from the agency plan-
ning process (the public) to independently evaluate and balance the
relevant environmental factors." An additional function of the EIS
is implicit in the first two: the agency is forced not only to consider
environmental factors, but to consider public opinion regarding the
importance of such factors." 9
113. See generally F. GRAD, supra note 99, § 9.02(1)(a)(i) at 9-37. See also note
110 and accompanying text.
114. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (1979); see also notes 136-145 infra and accompa-
nying text.
115. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981).
117. Id. The crux of the EIS requirement is to insure that environmental consider-
ations are integrated into the agency's planning; the EIS is the outward sign or proof
that environmental values and potential impacts have been considered during the
agency's decision-making process. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979).
118. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
119. Although NEPA directs an agency to consider environmental information,
the agency is not required to give greater weight to environmental factors than to other
considerations in its decision-making. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223, 227 (1980). Moreover, judicial review of the agency's use of environmental informa-
tion is quite narrow. An agency decision whether to prepare an EIS and what informa-
tion to address in an EIS is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
551-706 (1982), and only agency decisions which are arbitrary or capricious, or the re-
sult of an abuse of discretion, may be judicially overruled. Id. §§ 701-706. For discussion
Before preparing the Final EIS (FEIS), 2 ° the federal agency
must affirmatively request comments from other appropriate federal
agencies, appropriate state and local agencies, the public, and other
interested groups.12 1 This is accomplished by issuing a Draft EIS,
upon which such groups base their comments. 22 The federal agency
must respond to the comments in the Final EIS. 2 3 The EIS require-
ment partially insures against environmentally adverse decisions; the
agency must not only show that it has considered environmental im-
pacts, but also that relevant input received from the public has been
incorporated into its decisions. However, judicial review of the sub-
stantive aspects of an agency's decisions is limited. 24
Timing of the EISs in the Offshore Leasing Context
Public involvement is a crucial component of every stage of a fed-
eral agency's environmental impact analyses and decision-making.
Thus, the timing of the issuance of the Draft EIS, which is, in effect,
a solicitation of the public's input regarding the proposed OCS lease
sale, 125 is an important issue. Mineral Management Service's
(MMS) 126 current procedures preceding an OCS lease sale are:
(1) MMS initially selects general areas for leasing, and collects
preliminary assessments (geological, geophysical and environmental
studies made by other federal agencies and private industry) of the
oil, gas and other resource levels in that general area. 27
(2) A report based on these assessments and a Call for Tract
Nominations is published in the Federal Register, thereby soliciting
of judicial review of agency decisions under NEPA, see generally Comment, Environ-
mental Impact Statements: Instruments for Environmental Protection or Endless Litiga-
tion?, I 1 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 549-58 (1983); F. GRAD, supra note 99, § 9.03 at 9-
120 to -126.7; Shea, The Judicial Standard for Review of Environmental Impact State-
ment Threshold Decisions, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 63 (1980). See also, K. DAvis,
supra note 87, §§ 29.00-29.09.
120. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b) (1982).
121. Id. § 1503.1.
122. Id. § 1502.9(a).
123. Id. § 1503.4. The agency must consider the comments both individually and
collectively. Id.
124. To the extent that NEPA's procedural requirement of environmental evalua-
tion has been met, courts generally defer to the agency's judgment on the assumption
that the agency is best qualified to make that judgment. See F. GRAD, supra note 99,
§9.03(l)(b)(i) at 9-121.
125. See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
126. MMS has recently inherited the responsibility of administering the pre-leas-
ing activities preceding an OCS lease sale. 47 Fed. Reg. 47,006 (Oct. 22, 1982). The
DOI had initially delegated this responsibility to the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM). 43 C.F.R. Part 3300 (1982). The procedures followed by MMS with regard to
OCS oil and gas leasing are identical to those previously followed by the BLM - they
have merely been redesignated at 30 C.F.R. Part 256 (1983) from 43 C.F.R. Part 3300
(1982).
127. 30 C.F.R. § 256.17 (1983).
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the reaction of the public and the petroleum industry.128 In connec-
tion with the Call for Nominations, MMS must also request com-
ments on areas which should receive special concern and analysis. 129
This request generally includes or takes the form of an invitation for
nominations for certain tracts or areas to be excluded from leasing
for environmental reasons.' 30
(3) After considering the responses to the Call for Nominations,
MMS makes a preliminary selection of tracts for leasing.'
3
'
(4) Once the tracts are selected, MMS prepares a Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement. 32
(5) The DEIS is distributed to the public and governmental agen-
cies for comment; public hearings are held to receive reaction to the
DEIS.
(6) A Final Environmental Impact Statement is prepared, incor-
porating the public's comments and MMS's responses.1
33
(7) The FEIS is used by the Secretary of the Interior, along with
other considerations, in making a final determination of which tracts
he or she will lease.13 4
(8) A Final Notice of Sale, including tract selections and lease
stipulations, is published in the Federal Register.3 5
Currently, as noted above, a Draft EIS is prepared and circulated
after MMS has made preliminary tract selections based on industry
and public response to the Call for Nominations. Thus, local govern-
ments and the public must respond to the Call without the benefit of
the environmental data held by the federal government.
The present timing of the Draft EIS is the product of the Depart-
ment of the Interior's own interpretation of NEPA and the CEQ
128. Id. § 256.23.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 29,440 (1976).
131. 30 C.F.R. § 256.26 (1983).
132. The DEIS must comply "to the fullest extent possible" with the requirements
for the FEIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (1982). See also id. § 1502.10 (recommended for-
mat for impact statements), and §§ 1502.11-1502.18 (impact statement requirements).
The most important requirements for an EIS (draft or final) are: (1) thorough discussion
of alternatives to the proposed action, id. § 1502.14, (2) discussion of the affected envi-
ronment: the impact statement "shall succinctly describe the environment of the area(s)
to be affected or created by the alternatives under consideration," id. 1502.15, and (3)
scientific and analytical discussion of environmental consequences. Id. § 1502.16.
A third document, the Supplemental EIS, is required in certain circumstances when an
agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action after it has issued the FEIS, or
if significant new environmental information arises. Id. § 1502.9(c).
133. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (1982).
134. 30 C.F.R. § 256.26 (1983).
135. Id. § 256.29.
regulations, and of judicial interpretation of NEPA. No rigid statu-
tory or regulatory1 38 provisions govern the timing of the preparation
and circulation of the draft impact statement prior to an OCS lease
sale. NEPA itself does not dictate precise timing of the EIS137 and
does not mention a draft impact statement.138
The general goal of the Council on Environmental Quality's regu-
lations, however, is to foster public participation in the agency's
planning process as early as possible.3 9 Under the CEQ regulations,'
agency "procedures must insure that environmental information is
available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made
and before actions are taken.11 40 Agencies are directed to "integrate
the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time
to insure that planning and decisions reflect environmental values, to
avoid delays later in the process, and to head off potential con-
flicts." 4 The regulations also provide for extensive public participa-
tion in agency decision-making.142 Preliminary tract selection by the
DOI is a significant decision which should not be made without in-
formed public input.143 A Draft EIS circulated before this decision
would insure that environmental information is available to the pub-
136. Because the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations are applicable to,
and binding on, all federal agencies, they contain no particular provision fixing the tim-
ing of the Draft EIS in the offshore leasing context. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1982).
137. Section 102(2)(C) merely requires that an EIS exist at the time an agency
makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for major federal action, and that the
statement "shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review process". 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
CEQ's regulations direct federal agencies to commence preparation of an EIS as close
as possible to the time a proposal is being developed, so that it may be completed in time
for the FEIS to be included with any recommendation or report on the proposal. 40
C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1982). See also id., § 1508.23:
"'Proposal' exists at that stage in the development of an action when an agency
subject to the Act has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision on one
or more alternative means of accomplishing that goal and the effects can be
meaningfully evaluated .... A proposal may exist in fact as well as by agency
declaration that one exists."
138. The statement referred to in the Act is the Final EIS. 40 C.F.R. 1502.9
(1982).
139. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b), 1500.1 (a)-(d), 1500.2, 1501.7, 1502.1
(1982).
140. Id. § 1500.1(b). This is one of the stated purposes of the regulations. The EIS
is to be prepared early enough so that it can "serve practically as an important contribu-
tion to the decision-making process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions
already made." Id. § 1502.5.
141. Id. § 1501.2.
142. The regulations provide: (1) The agency must request the public's comments
and suggestions relating to the DEIS and must specifically respond to such input in the
FEIS, id. §§ 1503.1, 1503.4, (2) the agency may hold public hearings to gather the
publics's opinion, id. § 1506.6(c), (3) the agency is required to make diligent efforts to
involve the public in preparing and implementing NEPA procedures, id. § 1506.6(a), and
(4) agencies are required to circulate and make available to the public the Draft EIS and
the Final EIS. Id. § 1502.19.
143. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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lic at an early time,4 and would help insure that future DOI plan-
ning would be sensitive to environmental values.
145
Few cases have challenged the timing of the preparation and cir-
culation of the Draft EIS. Most cases relating to the timing of im-
pact statements have addressed the Final EIS. 46 In one case, de-
cided before the CEQ regulations were promulgated, plaintiff argued
for earlier public and local government participation in the Depart-
ment of Interior's pre-leasing planning process via the issuance of an
earlier EIS. Plaintiffs in County of San Diego v. Andrus 47 claimed
that DOI should have prepared an EIS before issuing the Call for
Nominations for OCS Lease Sale 48 .1
4
144. See supra text accompanying note 140.
145. See supra text accompanying note 141.
146. See, e.g., Aberdeen & Rockfish v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289 (1975); Andrus v.
Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979); Minnesota Public Interest Group v. Butz, 401 F.Supp.
1276 (D. Minn. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
The Supreme Court in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976), for example, ad-
dressed the claims of environmental groups that the DOI could not allow further develop-
ment of coal reserves in the region without preparing a comprehensive EIS under NEPA
§ 102(2)(C) on the entire region. The Court concluded that section 102 provides that a
Final EIS is not required to be ready until the time at which the agency makes a recom-
mendation or report on a proposal for federal action. Id. at 406. Furthermore, the Kleppe
Court admonished the Court of Appeals for devising a balancing approach to determine
at which point during the evolution of a potential proposal an impact statement should be
prepared. Id. Note that Kleppe was decided in 1976, more than two years before the
CEQ regulations required the use of DEIS in addition to an FEIS. See also Scientists'
Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy Commission, 481 F. 2d 1079 (D. C.
Cir. 1973) discussed infra text accompanying notes 161-163.
147. 10 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1681 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
148. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Mandamus,
County of San Diego v. And,-us, No. 77-0236 (S.D. Cal., April 14, 1977) [hereinafter
cited as Complaint]. Because the Call for Nominations invited the public to make nega-
tive nominations for specific offshore tracts to be excluded from the leasing plaintiffs
asserted, "The lack of availability of an [EIS] during this public review period precluded
meaningful input into this highly significant decision." Id. at 7. The plaintiffs believed
the various geological and environmental data that the BLM had collected and its pre-
liminary assessment of that area, should have been nade available to the public and local
governments by an EIS before plaintiffs were required to make negative nominations. Id.
at 10. The district court dismissed the suit, however, agreeing with the defendants that
the action was premature. 10 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1682. The court stated that,
"Before a meaningful EIS can be prepared, the agency must first formulate a proposal of
sufficient definiteness upon which the EIS can be based . . . . [A final] EIS is not re-
quired before a proposal has been formulated." Id. at 1683.
Despite the pre-CEQ regulations date of the San Diego case, its interpretation of when
the Final EIS must be completed is still valid; the regulations conform with, and indeed
support, this interpretation. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a), (b) (1982); see supra notes 139-
141 and accompanying text (discussion of CEQ's regulations relating to the timing of the
Draft and Final EISs).
RECOMMENDATION
The National Environmental Policy Act has become the major ve-
hicle for local government and environmental group challenges to
federal offshore leasing, largely because effective participation by
these groups under CZMA and OCSLA is almost impossible.""9 A
pre-Call for Nominations Draft EIS would: (1) provide for public
ind local government participation early in DOI's planning process
as required by NEPA and its regulations, 150 (2) help insure that
DOI's subsequent decisions would reflect local environmental con-
cerns,15' and (3) likely result in a reduction of lawsuits concerning
OCS leasing.152 In short, an earlier draft statement would increase
the public's chance to affect preliminary tract selection - a key de-
cision in the offshore leasing process.153
An Earlier Draft EIS
In the present Department of the Interior pre-leasing planning
process, some most important decisions - the selection of general
149. Under OCSLA, direct public participation is not provided for, and local gov-
ernments may give recommendations to the DOI only through the governor of the af-
fected state. The Secretary of the Interior must consider these suggestions, but he has
discretion to absolutely reject them. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). OC-
SLA seriously restricts local governments from participating in the OCS process: "There
is to be no independent basis for legal action by a local government unit [against the
DOI] . . . because of a dispute regarding any alleged failure to consult with . . . or
receive the recommendations of a local government." Gendler, supra note 57, at 356 &
n.75 (noting the frequent use of this disclaimer in Congressional explanations of federal-
state cooperation under the 1979 amendments to OCSLA).
Local governments indirectly participate in the offshore leasing process under CZMA
by working with the state in developing a comprehensive land-use program which, upon
approval by the Secretary of Commerce, activates CZMA's consistency requirements.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Similar to OCSLA, no provisions exist for
direct public participation in the DOI's decision-making process.
150. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text. There is opportunity for
early public input under the CEQ regulations in a process called "scoping." 40 C.F.R. §
1501.7 (1982). "There shall be an early and open process for determining the scope of
issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a proposed
action." Id. As part of the scoping process, the DOI must "(1) Invite the participation of
affected Federal, State, and local agencies ... and other interested persons (including
those who might not be in accord with the action on environmental grounds) . . . ." Id.
§ 1501.7(a)(1). The regulations also provide that the agency may hold meetings relating
to the proposed action, id. § 1501.7(b)(4); the DOI generally does hold public meetings
prior to OCS lease sales.
The problem is that such early "participation" falls on deaf ears. Nowhere is the DOI(MMS) required to respond to any such public input nor to incorporate it into its deci-
sion-making. On the other hand, once a Draft EIS has been issued, the DOI is required
to invite the public's comments, and to include them and specifically respond to them in
the Final EIS, id. §§ 1503.1-1503.4, which the Secretary of Interior must consider in
making a final decision regarding which tracts to lease. Id. § 1502.1.
151. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
152. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
153. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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leasing areas and the selection of specific tracts to be leased 54 _
occur before the DEIS is made available to the public. Local govern-
ments and public groups must respond to a Call for Nominations,
including negative nominations for certain tracts, without the aid of
the Draft EIS and the environmental impact data contained therein.
Furthermore, during the brief period between the publication of the
Call and the due date for public response, 15 5 the public and local
governments are asked to provide specific environmental information
to support their negative nominations.
The current timing of the preparation and circulation of the DEIS
also occurs too late in MMS's progression of pre-leasing decisions to
allow effective public input.1 6 The lack of DEIS availability during
these periods precludes meaningful local governmental and public
participation in this crucial governmental decision.1 57
Preliminary tract selection is perhaps one of the most important
decisions in the entire DOI (MMS) leasing process. This selection
provides impetus for the ultimate leasing of, and drilling in, those
specific tracts: it is a commencement toward actual leasing without
informed public input based on a Draft EIS. The Call and the pre-
liminary selection of tracts together represent a substantial commit-
ment by the DOI to proceed with oil production in the selected
area.
158
Such a substantial commitment should only be made after public
review and consideration of an environmental impact statement. The
District of Columbia Circuit has held that a Final EIS must be
ready in time to give the public an opportunity to assess environmen-
tal impact before the agency commits itself, even tentatively, to ac-
tion.1 59 The Department of the Interior's preliminary tract selection
154. See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
155. This period is generally about two months; see, e.g., Complaint, supra note
148, at 7.
156. At the time of the Call for Nominations, the DOI (through MMS) has al-
ready collected numerous assessments and studies of the geological and environmental
resources of the general area to be leased. See 30 C.F.R. § 256.22 (1983). The public is
asked, however, to make knowledgable comments and commitments to negative nomina-
tions in response to the Call without the benefit of this environmental information.
157. See Complaint, supra note 148, at 7.
158. Preliminary tract selection is environmentally significant not only because it
provides impetus for the ultimate leasing of specific tracts within the general area. This
decision is also significant because it greatly reduces the huge general OCS area (e.g.,
13.2 million acres for Lease Sale 48, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,440 (1976)) to specific tracts,
pinpointing the human and natural environments which might be affected by the poten-
tial adversities of offshore oil production.
159. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
is just such a tentative commitment to action - the actual leasing of
those tracts - and should occur only after public input through an
impact statement.
As noted earlier, the NEPA and its regulations are intended to
assure timely external input into federal agency decision-making.16 0
The consideration of environmental information early in the agency's
planning has been discussed in numerous decisions.
In Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy
Commission,16 the District of Columbia Circuit observed that envi-
ronmental impact statements must be prepared late enough to con-
tain meaningful information, but early enough that their contents
will help to ensure that decisions reflect environmental concerns.1 62
The court held that while the decision of when to prepare the state-
ment rests with the agency and not the courts, "some degree of judi-
cial scrutiny of an agency's decision that the time is not yet ripe for
a NEPA statement is necessary in order to ensure that the policies of
the Act are not being frustrated or ignored."" 3
Preliminary tract selection by the Department of the Interior is a
decision which fails to adequately assess environmental concerns. Ef-
fective external input is needed prior to this key decision:'" a draft
impact statement issued prior to the Call for tract nominations
would provide a basis for such input.
In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Commission,6 5 a case involving the integration of NEPA's require-
ments into the nuclear licensing process at the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, the court noted:
Compliance to the "fullest" possible extent would seem to demand that en-
vironmental issues be considered at every important stage in the decision
making process concerning a particular action - at every stage where an
overall balancing of environmental and nonenvironmental factors is appro-
priate and where alterations might be made in the proposed action to mini-
mize environmental costs.186
Preliminary tract selection in the OCS leasing process is such an
"important stage" where an overall balancing of factors is important
and where alterations might be made to minimize environmental
grounds, 427 U.S. 390 (1975).
160. See supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text.
161. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This case involved the development of the
liquid fast breeder reactor.
162. Id. at 1094.
163. Id. The court continued: "Agency decisions in the environmental area touch
on fundamental personal interests in life and health, and these interests have always had
a special claim to judicial protection." Id.
164. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
165. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
166. Id. at 1118.
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harm.16
7
As demonstrated above, early public participation on the basis of a
pre-Call for Nominations DEIS could result in more balanced DOI
decisions. A pre-Call impact statement would enhance the ultimate
goals of NEPA and the CEQ regulations by incorporating environ-
mental values into the DOI's planning in preliminary stages, insur-
ing subsequent decisions are not made with callous disregard for po-
tential environmental consequences. Additionally, earlier public and
local governmental input in response to a pre-Call DEIS could lead
to reduced NEPA litigation concerning OCS leasing.168
Opposition to an Earlier DEIS
Arguments against a pre-Call DEIS also exist. First, opponents
may contend an earlier impact statement would entail added eco-
nomic cost and delay the leasing program. Added costs and delay
must be subordinated, however, to the requirements and goals of
NEPA 6 9 for responsible environmental policy. Additionally, earlier
public participation could ultimately reduce the costs and delay of
the entire leasing program. Local governments and environmental
groups might be less likely to litigate to block OCS leasing if they
have enjoyed early meaningful participation in the federal govern-
ment's planning process.
A second factor opposing a pre-Call DEIS is precise data on po-
tential environmental impacts may not yet be available to incorpo-
rate into the DEIS. However, the public and local governments pres-
167. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
168. Because environmental groups and local governments would participate in the
initial stages of the DOI's planning, the DOI's subsequent decisions would be more likely
to reflect this participation. This could reduce litigation because: (1) these groups would
view DOI's decisions more favorably given their early involvement in that agency's plan-
ning, and (2) the decisions of the DOI subsequent to the DEIS would more likely reflect
the concerns of these groups.
169. "We have said, and we still believe, that '[c]onsiderations of administrative
difficulty, delay or economic cost will not suffice to strip the section [102(2)(C) of
NEPA] of its fundamental importance."' Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d
1238, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v.
Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F. 2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
DOI generally claims that a lack of funding would preclude earlier, extensive environ-
mental studies. An innovative approach would be to "require some percentage of the vast
profits made by Interior from oil and gas revenues to be put into an environmental stud-
ies fund and to require that some of the profits made by the oil companies from OCS
development be contributed to the same fund." Letter from Kelly Rigg, National OCS
campaign coordinator for Greenpeace USA (Aug. 25, 1983) (on file with SAN DIEGO
LAW REVIEW).
ently have the burden of quickly" ° determining specific en-
vironmental data to make intelligent suggestions in response to the
Call, while the Department of Interior holds valuable information
and assessments of the general leasing area beyond the public's
reach. If DOI made this general information available in a pre-Call
DEIS, public input would be undeniably more intelligent.171
A third opposition argument is that the public and the local gov-
ernments have other adequate opportunities to express their views
regarding environmental impacts. 172 The first problem with this ob-
servation, however, is that most of these opportunities come too late
in relation to the preliminary tract selection decision to allow the
public to affect that crucial decision.17 3 Second, input may be disre-
garded because MMS is not required by its rules to respond to the
input. A third problem is public participation through these adminis-
trative channels activates the exhaustion of the administrative reme-
dies rule.17 4 As long as the decision whether to proceed with a pro-
posed lease sale is in the DOI administrative process, DOI has
primary jurisdiction over any related dispute and judicial review is
seriously limited.1 75 Because the CEQ regulations provide precise
procedures for DOI to follow once it has issued a Draft EIS,17 6 a
DEIS issued before the Call for Nominations would increase the
chances of judicial review of DOI's (MMS's) procedural compliance
with NEPA.
CONCLUSION
The present timing of the Draft EIS in the OCS petroleum leasing
context is insufficient to fulfill the purpose of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act and its regulations. Local governments and the
public do not have an adequate opportunity, before preliminary tract
170. Supra note 155 and accompanying text.
171. A pre-Call DEIS, of course, could never be as precise in its evaluation of
alternatives and their impacts as a statement prepared after specific tracts had been se-
lected. NEPA does not, however, require that preparation of a Final EIS be delayed
until all relevant environmental effects are known. Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton,
471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973). A fortiori, such a claim could not be made with respect
to the Draft EIS. One alternative would be for MMS, after tract selection is made, to
supplement the pre-Call DEIS with the alternatives and impacts relevant to oil produc-
tion in the specific tracts.
172. Availability of other opportunities for public input into DOI's decision mak-
ing was a major reason County of San Diego v. Andrus was dismissed. 10 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1681, 1683 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
173. See, e.g., CEQ's "scoping" requirement at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1982), dis-
cussed supra note 150.
174. See, e.g., U.S. v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
175. See, County of San Diego v. Andrus, 10 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1681, 1683
(S.D. Cal. 1977) (citing Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1976); Far East
Conference v. U.S., 342 U.S. 570 (1952)).
176. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1982).
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selection, to assess and provide input regarding the potential environ-
mental consequences of the proposed leasing.
A Draft EIS issued prior to the Department of the Interior's Call
for Nominations would help cure the inadequacy of the current pro-
cess. A pre-Call impact statement would further the aims of NEPA
and the CEQ regulations by integrating public environmental values
into initial DOI decisions. This would help insure that subsequent
DOI planning would reflect these environmental concerns, and could
also result in reduced litigation over offshore leasing.
Congressional legislation is needed to clearly define the limits of
state and federal authority in the OCS, to lead to a more balanced
decision-making process, and to provide for more and earlier input
from the public, local governments and coastal states. Presently,
these groups must continue to resort to the courts to influence fed-
eral offshore leasing decisions.
EDWARD CORWIN

